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The Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP countries is part of a general evaluation of EU aid requested by the 
Development Council  in  June  1995.  This  report  is  part of the  second phase of the  study which 
focuses on: (i) policy formulation; (ii) policy dialogue between the EC and the individual ACP states; 
and (iii) aid implementation and management. 
The field stage of the study looks at policy dialogue and aid implementation in six countries and one 
region, concentrating on selected areas of EC assistance in each country/region.  The present report is 
concerned with the programme in  Liberia.  The other six reports cover Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Jamaica and the East Caribbean. 
The field study of the Liberia programme focuses on the role and management of EC aid in a post-
conflict situation.  The study  report  is  based on  the  findings  from a  short visit  to Monrovia and 
Abidjan that  was undertaken between March 25 and April 2 1998.  This visit coincided with a wider 
evaluation  of EC  aid  to  Liberia  which  is  currently  under  way.  The  in-country  field  work  was 
organised around: 
•  the review of project files; 
•  interviews with staff in the EC Aid Coordination Office in Monrovia; 
•  interviews  with  representations  of the  EU Member States in  Abidjan and  donors and 
NGOs in Monrovia; 
•  interviews with programme and project staff; and 
•  meetings with the evaluation team undertaking the more comprehensive evaluation of the 
EC aid programme to Liberia. 
The draft report was presented in May 1998 to the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development) of the European Union and the Commission. 
The evaluation team is  grateful for the support of the EC Delegation, and for the collaboration of 
Government officials and the representatives of other donors (particularly Member States). 
C. Montes 
ACP Evaluation Field Phase Coordinator 
Those wishing to  obtain copies of  the synthesis report or the  other case studies should contact the 
Head of  the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex of  the European Commission. Executive Summary 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Overview 
The focus of this study is the way in which the 
EC responded to  the civil war in Liberia.  Its 
main conclusion is that, despite the absence of 
a  resident  Delegation,  the  EC  has  had 
significant influence both in the peace process 
and  in  the  early  stages  of recovery  from  the 
civil war.  The necessity of having to  operate 
with relatively flexible financing mechanisms 
and  of allowing  a  relatively  high  degree  of 
decentralisation in the management of the aid 
programme  has  resulted  in  a  responsive  and 
efficient  use  of  aid  resources.  The  high 
calibre  of  EC  and  technical  assistance 
personnel working on the Liberia programme 
has  been a  key  factor in  its  relative  success. 
At the same time a number of the limitations 
in  EC  administrative  procedures  have  been 
highlighted.  The experiences  of the  Liberia 
programme  are  likely  to  have  significant 
relevance in considering future reforms to the 
systems and procedures for the management of 
EC aid.  A  feature of the Liberia programme 
has been the very close cooperation achieved 
between the  EC  and the Member States  with 
joint  operations  and  bilateral  aid  resources 
being  placed  under  the  management  of  the 
EC' s Aid Coordination Office (ACO). 
Country Context 
The civil war that began in  1980 formed  the 
backdrop to the EC'  s cper::tions in Liberia. In 
1980, President Tolbert was replaced in a coup 
by  Master  Sergeant  Doe.  While  the  coup 
placed indigenous Liberians in  power for the 
first  time,  it  also  marked  the  beginning  of 
years  of increasingly  bitter civil  war.  After 
the start of the rebellion led by Charles Taylor, 
in  1990,  the  Economic  Community  of West 
African  States  (ECOWAS)  sent  in  a  force 
(ECOMOG) with the aim of imposing a cease-
fire. 
Between  1990 and  1996, a  series of attempts 
by the UN and ECOMOG to  bring an  end to 
the  fighting  ended  in  failure.  The  fighting 
IDC - August 1998  1 
became particularly intense in April 1996 and 
Liberia was the subject of international media 
attention.  In August 1996, a lasting cease-frre 
was achieved, prompted in part by war fatigue, 
but  also  by  international  efforts  to  secure 
peace.  Elections were held in June 1997, and 
the new government, under President Charles 
Taylor, took office in August 1997. 
EC Aid to Liberia 
The  onset  of war  caused  the  suspension  of 
normal EC aid operations in Liberia. The EC 
Delegation  was  withdrawn.  In  1994,  during 
some of the fiercest fighting, the EC increased 
the  scale  of  its  operations.  The  Liberian 
National Authorising Officer (NAO) requested 
that the Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF 
act on behalf of the Government of Liberia in 
the management of the EDF. As a  result, the 
EDF for Liberia could be directly executed by 
the  EC.  In  the  same  year,  the  ACO  was 
established in Monrovia, to provide a base for 
EC operations. 
The  ACO  is  staffed  almost  entirely  by 
Technical Assistants (TAs) who are provided 
by consultancy firms.  Many of the TAs have 
considerable in-country  experience.  Projects 
implemented by the ACO have included: (i) a 
jobs-for-guns  programme  aimed  the 
reintegration  of  ex-combatants  which  has 
played a key role in building the conditions for 
sustained peace; (ii) a child combatant support 
programme  aimed  at  reumtmg  child 
combatants  with  their  families;  (iii) a  food 
security  programme  which  is  promoting rice 
cultivation,  arboriculture  and  horticulture; 
(iv) infrastructure  repair  focusing  on  the 
rehabilitation  of  roads,  bridges  and  water 
supplies;  (v) support  to  the  social  sectors  in 
the form of relief activities,  and  increasingly 
assistance to the primary health and education 
sectors; and (vi) logistical assistance with the 
organisation  of  democratic  elections  which 
involved  joint  operations  with  the  Member 
States (particularly with the Dutch and Danish 
governments).  Much of the  EC assistance  to Liberia  has  been  delivered  through  the 
relatively  flexible  mechanisms  of the  Micro 
Projects Programme (MPP). 
Policy Dialogue 
The main EC policy aims have been to restore 
peace  and  assist  in  the  restoration  of 
infrastructure  and  services.  Policy  dialogue 
has been undertaken in difficult circumstances 
requiring  the  maintenance  of  contacts  with 
different  faction  leaders.  Nevertheless,  the 
achievements  have  been  considerable, 
particularly  in  the  context  of the  "guns  for 
job" programme and the  support provided to 
the 1997 elections. EC interventions have also 
facilitated  the  transition  from  emergency  to 
development assistance operations. 
Since the installation of the new Government, 
the ACO has consulted with it on policy issues 
and has  also developed good links with local 
governments.  In  the  rehabilitation of public 
infrastructure  and  services,  the  ACO  has 
deliberately  sought  to  address  underlying-
policy  concerns,  particularly  relating  to 
management and financial sustainability. 
In  the  absence  of  stable  government  policy 
dialogue  and coordination  with  other donors 
and  with  ECOMOG  has  been  important. 
Generally,  this  coordination  has  been 
effective,  although  that  with  the  UN 
organisations  has  been  made  difficult  by 
problems  within  the  UN'  s  operations,  in 
Liberia.  At project level there has been close 
collaboration  with  other  donors  and  with 
NGOs.  However the EC needs to strengthen 
the  way  it  interacts  with  NGOs,  particularly 
with  those  which  have  strong  analytical  and 
policy capacities. 
An effective  and  supportive  relationship  has 
been built up between the EC and the Member 
States.  Some  Member  States  have  directly 
assisted  programmes  managed  by  the  ACO. 
The  Desk Officer  has  ensured  that  Member 
States are well informed about developments 
in Liberia.  Member States' representations in 
Abidjan have been regularly briefed  and  the 
EC Coordinator in Monrovia now attends their 
monthly  meetings.  The  Africa  Working 
Group  in  Brussels  has  also  played  an  active 
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role in  the coordination between the EC and 
the Member States. 
Provided that peace can be maintained, the aid 
relationship  in  Liberia  will  increasingly 
towards  reconstruction  and  development 
support,  with the  Bretton Woods  Institutions 
(Bwn playing an increasingly important role. 
With a  substantial operational and analytical 
capacity  and  good  working  relations  with 
other  stakeholders,  the  EC  can  expect  to 
continue  to  play  a  key  role  in  donor 
coordination. 
Aid Management 
The administration of the Liberia programme 
has been based on the request by the NAO that 
the Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF act 
on behalf of the Government of Liberia in the 
management of the EDF.  This has  provided 
considerable  operational  advantages  and 
flexibility.  The programme is also unusual in 
the  very  close  coordination  that  has  been 
achieved between ECHO financing and EDF 
support  which  has  allowed  an  effective 
transition to  be achieved between emergency 
and development assistance.  The preliminary 
evidence is  that the programme has achieved 
considerable  success  in  delivering  aid 
efficiently and effectively.  The main factors 
behind this success are: 
•  Delegated  and  decentralised  management 
within  an  accountable  framework.  The 
Desk  Officer  in  Headquarters  was 
delegated a high level of responsibility for 
the  management  and  performance  of the 
programme.  He  then  decentralised  much 
of this responsibility on operational issues 
to the ACO. 
•  Strong  operational  capacity  within  the 
ACO and a largely supportive institutional 
environment. 
•  The recruitment of high quality staff which 
has  allowed  the  ACO  to  build  up  a 
formidable  body  of  competence.  On 
reason  why  the  EC  was  able  to  manage 
successfully  the  interface  between  relief 
and  development  assistance  was  that  the 
T As  combined  strong  technical  expertise 
with  a  good  understanding  of emergency 
situations. •  Good  coordination  and  the  provision  of 
comprehensive  and  timely  information  to 
all parties. 
•  Efficient  management  and  administration 
facilitated by a contractual structure which 
has  combined  T  A  fees  and  operational 
budgets  within  a  single  contract.  While 
this  has  generally  worked  well,  delays  in 
payments  from  Headquarters  to  the 
contractors  have  at  times  necessitated  the 
halting  of  disbursements  on  project 
activities. 
The  transition  to  normalised  relations  will 
provide  a  challenge  to  the  EC.  There  is  a 
significant risk that as  the  aid  programme  in 
Liberia transfers to the general EC finance and 
procurement system, it could lose many of the 
features of operational flexibility  which have 
contributed to its success. 
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3 Chapter I  Country Context 
CHAPTER I.  COUNTRY CONTEXT 
A.  The Civil War 
The civil war that began in  1980 formed  the backdrop to  the EC' s operations in Liberia.  It altered 
Liberia's needs, and affected the ability of the EC to help satisfy those needs. 
The civil war had its roots both in the historical domination of the political system by the descendants 
of freed American slaves, and in  ethnic conflict. Until  1980, the country was dominated by a small 
group of families. The True Whig Party was the only significant political organisation.  However, by 
1980, President W.  Tolbert had lost control of the economy. He was replaced in a coup by Master 
Sergeant S.  Doe,  who  suspended the  constitution.  While the  coup placed indigenous Liberians in 
power for the first time, it also marked the beginning of 16 years of civil war. 
In  the  years  that  followed  the  1980  coup,  Doe's increasingly  authoritarian  regime  faced  growing 
opposition. In 1985, a serious coup attempt resulted in many deaths and in reprisals by Doe's regime 
against the Gio ethnic group, who were allegedly responsible for the coup attempt. In  the following 
year, Doe was  sworn in  as  president of the Second Republic under a new constitution, but unrest 
continued. In  1989, a small group of armed rebels, led by Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia from Cote 
d'Ivoire. Killings by the Armed Forces of Liberia, who were dominated by Doe's supporters, fuelled 
resentment among the northern Gios and Manos. The latter increasingly supported Taylor's National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).  By  June  1990,  only Monrovia was  under Doe's control.  Doe's 
survival  was  partly  aided  by  a conflict which  had  erupted between the NPFL  and  the  breakaway 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). 
Intervention  in  the  civil  war  by  the  international  community  began  in  1990.  The  Economic 
Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  was  concerned  at  the  threat  of  regional 
destabilisation,  and  assembled  a  force  (ECOMOG)  with  the  aim of imposing a cease-fire.  Other 
countries  and  aid  agencies  supported  the  deployment  of ECOMOG.  This  support continued even 
when  ECOMOG  became  involved  in  the  conflict.  By  October  1990,  ECOMOG  had  established 
control over Monrovia. In the meantime, however, Doe was captured and killed by the INPFL. When 
Taylor's NPFL attacked Monrovia, the ECOMOG forces were deployed to defend the city, and were 
supported by  the  breakaway INPFL.  An  Interim Government of National  Unity  (IGNU)  was  then 
installed, but it was not recognised by the NPFL. 
Regional  destabilisation,  which  ECOWAS  feared,  became  a  serious  threat.  By  early  1991,  the 
conflict had spread to Sierra Leone. Taylor's troops were joined by rebels from Sierra Leone, while 
Sierra Leone government forces  provided support to troops loyal to former president Doe who had 
formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). In April 1992, Major 
General Joseph Momoh was overthrown in Sierra Leone in a military coup. 
B.  Cease-Fires and Negotiation 
The following years were marked by  a series of cease-fires which repeatedly broke down. Talks in 
m.id-1991  in  Yamoussoukro,  the  capital  of Cote  d'lvoire,  led  to  an  agreement  to  disarm  under 
ECOMOG supervision. Both sides claimed to accept the agreement but failed to do so in practice.  In 
October 1992, the NPFL, in  a surprise attack, nearly overran Monrovia, and were only repulsed by 
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Nigerian airforce jets and warship bombardments. The UN imposed an arms sale embargo on Liberia. 
A new cease-fire was signed in Geneva and ratified in Benin in mid-1993. 
In February 1994 it was agreed that disarmament would begin under the Y amoussoukro terms. A 368-
strong UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMll..) was sent to supervise the process. In March, the 
Interim  Government  was  replaced  by  a  Transitional  Council  of  State  (TCS),  made  up  of 
representatives from the Interim Government, from Taylor's forces, and from forces loyal to ULIMO. 
The TCS was intended to rule until presidential elections scheduled for September 1994. However, a 
series  of splits  among  the  warring  groups  ended  this  cease-fire.  Further negotiations  took place 
during the remainder of 1994, while fighting continued. In  August 1995, Liberia's thirteenth peace 
agreement  was  reached  in  Ahuja,  known  as  the  Ahuja  accord.  The  new  cease-fire  was  initially 
respected, but heavy fighting broke out in  December 1995 in  the north west. In  April 1996, anarchy 
descended on Monrovia, with looting and killing lasting over two months. 
A second Ahuja peace agreement was reached in August 1996. The fighting that had begun in April 
was extensively covered in the international media, which forced the international community to play 
a more active role. The much criticised head of ECOMOG was replaced by General Malu, who was 
determined  to  resolve  the  situation.  At  the  same  time,  the  USA  and  the  EU member  states  (in 
particular the Netherlands) provided the ECOMOG forces with much needed logistics. The EC was 
also able to ensure that financial support was available. In addition, Charles Taylor now realised that 
he  would not be able to  gain power through further armed conflict.  With little left to  loot, and a 
general desire among the population for peace, the conditions were finally  right for establishing a 
more lasting peace. 
C.  The Post-Conflict Period 
The US  government deployed a special envoy (in addition to its ambassador) to promote the peace 
process. Minister Pronk of the Netherlands visited Monrovia in September 1996, and frequently after 
that,  to  support the  Ahuja II  peace  process.  The EC  was  able to  commit a  substantial amount of 
resources immediately,  in  contrast to  the performance of the  UN in  1995  when delivery had been 
persistently delayed. The EC provided important support during the peace process by prioritising the 
roads and bridges programme, which facilitated the deployment of ECOMOG forces throughout the 
country. The EC was also able to  help create activities for demobilised soldiers through a  'jobs for 
guns' project. 
Elections, after some delays, were held in June 1997. The new government, under President Charles 
Taylor, took office on 2 August 1997. Unfortunately, ethnic divisions have been fostered by the war, 
and ethnic tensions are reported to  be increasing in some regions. There are reports of considerable 
quantities of concealed weapons as well of new and larger weapons being brought into Liberia. 
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CHAPTER II.  EC AID TO LffiERIA 
A.  Size and Composition of EC Aid 
The onset of war caused the suspension of normal EC aid operations in  Liberia.  The EC evacuated 
all its staff.  The office was destroyed and all work there was  abandoned. The Delegate remained in 
post at  Headquarters  for  some  time.  A  new  Desk Officer was  appointed at  the  end of 1992.  Old 
project files  were sorted out and closed. From 1991  to  1994, the only available EC assistance was 
ECHO funds, food aid, and assistance for refugees. 
The First Rehabilitation Programme 
In February  1994,  during  the  fiercest  fighting,  the  Liberian  National  Authorising Officer (NAO) 
requested that the Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF act on behalf of the Government of Liberia 
in the management of the EDF.  As  a result, the EDF for Liberia could be directly executed by the 
EC.  This  act  made  possible  the  launching of the  First Rehabilitation  Programme  in  March  1994 
(Table  1).  The Financing Agreement requires the  Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF to  act on 
behalf of the NAO of the Republic of Liberia. 
Table 1:  EDF First Rehabilitation ProJect Allocation 
EDF  Allocation (MECU) 
6th EDF  13.4 
7th EDF (ex 5th)  6.6 
6th EDF (additional)  1.8 
TOTAL  21.8 
#  Initially an additional5 MECU was committed from Art. 255 
resources. As the Liberian programme had not yet started, this was 
withdrawn in order to assist refugees in other operations. 
The  EC' s  objective  in  the  First  Rehabilitation  Programme  was  to  assist  in  advancing  the  peace 
process and to  'achieve an aid continuum moving from relief to  rehabilitation to development'. The 
EC' s aims were to  provide access to  basic health facilities, clean water and shelter, and to  achieve 
food security. The management objectives in the Programme were to: 
•  maintain neutrality between the factions 
•  respond to needs in a cost effective and efficient manner 
•  identify reliable local partners 
•  rehabilitate government services. 
Table 2 shows the allocation of expenditures incurred under the Programme. 
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Table 2:  First Rehabilitation Project Expenditures 
Area  Expenditure 
(MECU) 
Health  3.1 
Resettlement & Reintegration  8.0 
Road and Bridge Repairs  5.4 
Monrovia Water Supply  3.4 
Preparatory Studies for Elections  0.2 
Aid Coordination Office  0.8 
General TA, Refugee Co-ordination & Studies  0.8 
Total  21.8 
The Second Rehabilitation Programme 
A financing proposal requesting 27 MECU for the Second Rehabilitation Programme was submitted 
in February  1998 (Table 3). The programme is intended to be implemented over a two year period 
during  which  time  preparations  will  be  made  to  hand  back  to  the  Government,  the  NAO'  s 
responsibility for the authorisation of financing. This handover will only take place after there has 
been progress in strengthening governance and human rights. 
The Second Programme lies  within the relief-rehabilitation-development continuum set out in the 
Communication to the Council.  Under the programme, general aid relief is to be phased out and the 
emphasis will be on strengthening the delivery of basic services. Priority will also be given to the 
resettlement of those  who  were forced  to  leave their homes,  800,000 of whom moved elsewhere 
within the country, and 700,000 of whom left the country. 
Table 3:  Second Rehabilitation Programme 
Area  Expenditure 
(MECU) 
Health  3.0 
Resettlement & Reintegration  14.0 
Rehabilitation of Infrastructure  4.0 
Strengthening local institutions  4.0 
Evaluation and Monitoring  0.1 
Aid Coordination Office  0.7 
Contingencies  1.2 
Total  27.0 
Other EC Aid Instruments 
In  addition to the financing provided from the EDF, the Liberia programme has received fmancing 
from the ECHO programmes and from EC budget lines in order to fmance relief work. 
B.  The Aid Coordination Office 
The Aid Coordination Office (ACO) in Monrovia was established in September 1994, to provide a 
base for EC operations in  the absence of a  Delegation.  The office was staffed primarily by  TAs 
provided under a number of different programmes projects (Table 4).  In early 1998, there were five 
consultancy  firms  working  from  the  ACO.  The  office  is  almost  entirely  staffed  by  Technical 
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Assistants (TAs), some of whom have  in-country experience going back to the  1980s.  They have 
played an important role in the success of the operation. 
Table 4:  Staffing of Aid Coordination Office 
Programme/Project  Staffing/location 
Refugee Coordination Programme  0  Based in Cote d'lvoire and Guinea- Two TAs 
Micro Projects and  CART  0  Eight TAs with four offices outside Monrovia 
Infrastructure Programme (water sector  0  FourTAs 
and ports) 
Election Support Programme  0  One permanent TA with additional short-term TA 
during the election period.  Closed in April 1998. 
Food Security  0  DGVIII-91 TA- two in Monrovia and one in Cote 
d'lvoire 
Health Programme  0  Three TAs 
TA Support to the Ministry of Planning and  0  One TA to help with Country Strategy and NIP 
Economic Affairs. 
ACO Office  0  Two TAs including one information officer 
C.  The Micro-Projects Programme 
Much  of the  EC  aid  to  Liberia  is  implemented  through  the  mechanism  of the  Micro-Projects 
Programme (MPP).  In Liberia, this brings together all the components of the EC operation, through 
its personnel, logistics and cash flow. 
The programme's technical assistance (T  A) and management of the operating budget were contracted 
after  tender,  with  the  contract  being  signed  on  1  April  1996
1
•  Initially,  the  objectives  of the 
programme included support: (i) to local communities in restoring health services, water supplies and 
the education system; (ii) in  enhancing food security; and (iii) in  repairing basic infrastructure. The 
programme was  to  be organised around Programme Co-ordination Centres from which three Area 
Programme Co-ordinators were to identify partner NGOs and private contractors to implement the 
micro-projects. They were to  manage a Small Projects Fund to provide grants up to a maximum of 
10,000 ECU. 
Fighting in April 1996 altered these operational plans. TheTAs were given a brief to operate much 
more flexibly. The programme expanded beyond the normal scale of micro project activities, and the 
Small Projects Funds were raised from 1.5 MECU to 2.2 MECU. 
In addition, the responsibilities of the consultancy contractor were extended to the management of a 
trucking and  logistics  operation, based around  100 trucks  provided by the Dutch Government, to 
which  were  subsequently  added  30  Land-Rovers.  This  is  part  of the  Combined Agencies  Relief 
Transport  programme,  which  facilitates  transport  to  other  agencies.  In  1997,  141  people  were 
employed in the service of this fleet and its fuel consumption exceeded 75,000 litres per month. 
The contract was awarded to Agrisystems (Overseas) Ltd 
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D.  Programmes Supported by the EC 
The projects operated from the ACO constitute an  integrated and  mutually  supportive programme. 
Co-ordination between  the  employment and resettlement components  is  particularly important. To 
date,  over  160  micro-projects  have  been  implemented.  The  projects  implemented  by  the  ACO 
include: 
•  the 'jobs for guns' programme; 
•  child combatant support; 
•  the food security programme; 
•  infrastructure repair; 
•  social sector support; and 
•  election support 
The  'Jobs for Guns' Programme 
In September 1996,  the EC held a critical three day workshop in  the ACO which was attended by 
faction  representatives from the National Disarmament and Demobilisation Committee. It was  also 
attended by Charles Taylor, who subsequently became President, as well as ECOMOG and UNOMTI... 
observers.
2  At  the  workshop  the  EC  took  the  lead  in  presenting  proposals  for  assisting  the 
reintegration of fighters into civil society. It seems that the assurances given by the EC to the factions 
were the first such offer of support that the fighters had received.-While the ECOMOG Commander 
provided security guarantees, the EC provided incentives for the fighters to disarm. 
The programme operates by  supporting Temporary Work Programmes, which last for three months 
and enable fighters to  receive counselling and to work alongside civilians. Fighters are then put into 
Community Development Programmes. These programmes are managed by community leaders and 
thereby  bring  ex-combatants  under  the  authority  of community  structures.  EC  support  covers: 
(i) funding to support up  to  10,000 over a six  month re-integration period; (ii) transport; (iii) seeds 
and tools from an EC food security project; and (iv) provision of TA to support the operation. 
Over 7,000 ex-combatants have participated in the Temporary Work Programmes. This project has 
thereby played an  important role in  the  peace process.  Continued support for these activities is  a 
priority. 
Child Combatant Support 
The MPP has financed centres to  assist the reintegration of child combatants into the community.
3 
The objective of this project was to reunite child combatants with their families and to support local 
communities. For those children whose families could not be traced, other community solutions have 
been  explored.  Children  in  temporary  shelters  have  access  to  accelerated learning and  vocational 
training. 
The Food Security Programme 
The MPP has supported the Food Security Programme.  Agricultural projects have concentrated on 
swamp rice growing, arboriculture and horticulture. In 1997,  19 swamp sites were cleared, planted, 
and  handed  over  to  local  communities,  with  30  sites  identified  for  the  following  season.
4  Some 
10,000 acres of abandoned tree crops have been cleared, brushed and disinfected, and nearly 3,000 
The US and the UN agencies declined invitations to attend. 
Working with Save the Children, UK. 
Swamp rice is considered suitable for sale to urban markets, while upland rice is favoured for local consumption. 
Swamp rice cultivation has therefore brought cash into local economies. 
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ex-combatants  employed.  Vegetable  and  maize  seeds  have  been  distributed  to  more  than  20,000 
families.  The seeds and tools  operations  have  produced enough rice  to  meet nearly half the food 
requirements of those internally displaced. A detailed programme of aquaculture rehabilitation has 
been prepared. 
Infrastructure Repair 
The civil war destroyed most of the infrastructure in the country. Many bridges and roads have either 
been damaged or fallen into a state of disrepair, sometimes breaking critical lines of communication. 
The  EC'  s  road  and  bridges  programme  initially  played  a  vital  role  in  opening  up  the  lines  of 
communication for the delivery of relief supplies.  However,  after the  Ahuja IT  agreement the EC 
switched its focus to facilitating the deployment of ECOMOG forces throughout the country. Since 
the elections, the EC'  s focus has switched again, and its aim is now to ensure that roads are open so 
that refugees can return to their villages.  Over 30 bridges have been or are being constructed through 
a contract with a local contractor, supervised by the project engineer.  In addition, some 20 schools 
and over 10 clinics have been rebuilt, and nearly 30 wells have been constructed.  Implementation has 
been undertaken through the MPP, although this is not a particular appropriate instrument for such 
projects. 
The EC has also co-ordinated an innovative scheme for restoring Monrovia's water supply.
5 Initially 
the EC and other donors assisted in the restoration of basic supplies for the city, especially for newly 
arrived refugees.  In  1995,  the EC,  through  a TA contract, started to  work with the Liberia Water 
Supply Company to  restore  the  city's water supply.  The EC  made  its  support conditional  on  the 
transparency of financial management. In practical terms, this meant joint management and fmancial 
control, enabling revenues to be ploughed back into the water utility. The EC'  s policy has been to 
ensure the financial viability of the water supply before embarking on capacity building or further 
policy formulation. Water loss has been reduced within a short space of time. 
The EC programme has also sought to help the Monrovia Port Authorities restore essential craft and 
dock equipment and clear the port of shipwrecks.  The approach followed has emphasises measures 
to assist the financial viability of the institutions involved. 
Social Sector Support 
The main focus of social sector support has been on the health sector, which received ECHO support 
through NGOs. As a result of the civil war, health clinics had been looted and few were fully staffed. 
The Ministry of Health was demoralised.  At the same time the World Health Organisation activities 
in Liberia was not well organised, and there were wider problems with the operations of UN system. 
T As began work in r-1ay  1997. The programme, supported by ECHO funds, was initially focused on 
relief.  The EC  has  helped  co-ordinate  the  essential  drugs  programme  and  five  NGO-run  health 
projects  which  are  funded  by  the  EC.  The programme  now  also  involves  developing sustainable 
structures to deliver primary health care. The EC is involved in developing health services at county 
level, and provides institutional support to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. 
The  support  to  the  education  sector  has  been  limited  to  repairs  of non-government  schools
6
•  In 
addition, the EC has co-financed with  UNICEF a project to reprint primary school textbooks (1.8 
MECU). 
Outside the Micro Projects Programme. 
Government schools do not have operational budgets. 
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Election Support 
When it became clear that there was the political will among faction leaders to maintain peace and to 
hold elections, a team of four electoral and  management advisers  visited Liberia over a period of 
three months to compile a report for the EC. As a result of this report, the EC agreed to give technical 
and financial assistance to  the electoral commission under a T A agreement.  The EC also agreed to 
provide an observer mission. The report was submitted on February 1997, and the project started one 
month  later.  The EC  assistance  was  provided  at  a  time  when  neither the  UN  or the  USA  were 
prepared to take the lead in supporting the election process. 
The EC played, along with ECOW  AS, the US  Embassy and the UN, an important role in supporting 
the  Independent Election Committee.  In  addition,  the  Dutch  and  Danish  governments contributed 
US$ 1.2  m  to  a  fund  managed  by  the  EC  to  support  the  election  process.  They  provided  both 
financial and political support to the EC office in  Monrovia, particularly in issuing salary payments 
to election and registration clerks. 
The EC helped to  reconstruct the Election Committee building and provided a TA to advise on the 
election process. During the election, the EC organised and deployed a large mission of observers 
from both the EC and Member States. The EC made its logistical capacity available to distribute and 
collect ballot boxes, and to  mobilise observers and election supervisors.  It  is  estimated that,  at its 
peak, the election support programme utilised some 85% of the EC' s logistical capacity in Liberia. 
The successful outcome of this  project was  based on  the  rapid  mobilisation  of assistance,  strong 
logistical capacity, the quality of analysis, and a firm commitment to supporting the demobilisation 
process.  The experience gained has relevance to other regional conflict situations. 
E.  Role of Other Donors 
Liberia has  traditionally  had  strong links  with  the  USA  which  maintains  a  large  aid programme 
supporting the supply of food, health-care and water. Its main partners have been NGOs and the UN. 
The USA has also  supported the operations of ECOMOG. The EC has had good contacts with the 
local representation of the USA, but there have been a number of problems arising from the lack of 
clarity in overall US policy towards Liberia. 
The EC  has  attempted  to  liaise  with  UN  agencies,  but  there  is  little  evidence  of a  constructive 
dialogue at policy level. In particular, there has been frustration at the UN' s position over aid delivery 
to the interior. However, the relationship at programme level has been good, particularly on the 'jobs 
for guns'  programme on  which there has  been good collaboration with UNOPS.  The EC is  also a 
financier of the UNICEF programme and is a partner with the WFP. 
Many international and local NGOs have received funds from the EC. Over the years, international 
NGOs have developed an effective co-ordination and advocacy strategy. 
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CHAPTER III.  POLICY DIALOGUE 
A.  Introduction 
In the  absence  of a  stable  government,  policy  dialogue  in  Liberia  has  had  to  be  innovative.  In 
developing policy, the EC also had to take into account its capacity to  deliver aid. The main policy 
aims were to  bring peace to  the country and to  assist the transition to  development. The financing 
proposal for the  First Rehabilitation Project and internal documents are consistent with these aims. 
The transfer of responsibilities from  the  NAO  to  the EC  allowed  the  use  of EDF in  Liberia and 
facilitated the design of a flexible and comprehensive aid programme. 
B.  Relations with the Government and Factions 
During the war, the EC aid programme was supposed to  'maintain neutrality and balance in assisting 
the victims of the conflict on all sides'. However, the EC operation was based in Monrovia, and this 
in itself was seen as biased by some faction leaders based in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, 
the EC managed to achieve its neutrality goal, although at times it was necessary to carry out delicate 
negotiations with different factions as well as the government.  The success of the policy dialogue in 
this phase is measured by the end of hostilities and the role that the EC played in securing peace. 
In the post-conflict period, the policy dialogue has increasingly focused on issues of governance and 
human  rights  and  on  sectoral  issues  particularly  relating  to  the  support  being  provided  for 
government  infrastructure  and  services.  Particular  successes  have  been  the  "guns-for-jobs" 
programme and  the  support provided  for  the  1997  elections.  The new  government has  a  limited 
capacity for policy development or implementation and consequently the EC and other donors have 
of necessity had to take the lead in developing the policy agenda. 
Initially,  the  policy  dialogue  has  had  to  built  up  outside  of  the  normal  framework  of  inter-
governmental relations.  Relations were built up between staff at Headquarters, TAs and a number of 
interlocutors in  Liberia. In  some cases, there was confusion as  to  whether or not individuals were 
speaking officially on behalf of the EC.  Since the installation of the new government, the ACO has 
been careful to consult the government on policy issues, including Presidential speeches.  It has also 
developed links with local government, which will assume more importance in the future. 
C.  Sectoral Policy Dialogue 
As was noted above, there is an emerging sectoral policy dialogue based around those sectors where 
the  EC  is  providing  assistance.  The  issues  being  addressed  reflect  the  transition  in  EC  funded 
activities  from  emergency  aid  to  rehabilitation  assistance.  The  EC  is  currently  supporting  the 
rebuilding  of government  utilities,  social  services,  agriculture  and  infrastructure.  In  the  public 
utilities sectors, where the EC has built up considerable in-country expertise, the policy dialogue has 
already  achieved  the  removal  of the  water  utility  from  government  control,  with  a  consequent 
improvement in  financial  sustainability  and  a  reduction  in  staff.  In  the  health  sector,  the  policy 
dialogue is resulting in more reliable drug supplies through the strengthening of the operation of the 
National Drug Service revolving fund.  Discussions on improved incentives for health professionals 
are now under way. TAs are to be placed in the Ministries of Health and Education. 
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D.  Policy Coordination with Other Donors 
The EC has developed close relations with a large number of aid partners in Liberia.  These include 
the USA, the UN agencies, NGOs and the ECOMOG forces in  which Nigeria has been the dominant 
player.  Until  now,  the  BWis have  played a relatively small  role,  but this  will  soon change.  An 
effective and supportive relationship has been built up between the EC and Member States. 
Initially, the effectiveness of the  international assistance to  Liberia may have been reduced by  its 
focus on supporting ad hoc interventions.  For example, large amounts of food aid were supplied with 
limited understanding of the food economy and of targeting mechanisms that could minimise adverse 
impacts on  local markets.  This situation has  now improved markedly with better coordination and 
regular meetings between the different donors and food  aid advisers involved.  The EC has played 
and influential role in this dialogue. 
Cooperation With  UN Agencies 
The relationship between the UN and the EC in the field is clearly important. Co-ordination between 
the  UN  and  the  EC  has  been  made  difficult  by  the  UN' s  internal  problems  with  its  Liberia 
programmes, and by the absence of a full time EC Delegate.  Coordination should improve with the 
reorganisation of ~  efforts based on  the  model  of the  strategic framework used in  Afghanistan. 
Where  the  UN  and  EC  worked  together  at  an  operational  level,  the  relationship  has  often  been 
mutually  supportive.  A  good  example  of  this  is  their  joint  work  on  the  demobilisation  and 
disarmament programmes and on the  'jobs for guns'  project on  which UNOPS cooperated with the 
MPP team. 
Cooperation "With NGOs 
The EC  works  with a number of international and  local  NGOs.  Co-ordination at project level  is 
good.  In  particular,  NGOs  were  extremely  appreciative  of the  EC's efforts  to  build  a  transport 
network in Liberia.  NGOs also cooperate well together. In  1996, after many of the agencies suffered 
from looting during the fighting, they produced an agreed set of working principles for those involved 
in humanitarian assistance. 
The health sector has been a key area for cooperation between the EC and NGOs and is one where 
NGOs will continue play an  important role in  the health services delivery until the Government is 
able  to  rebuild  its  operations. The NGOs  are  also closely involved with EC contractors and local 
communities, in the resettlement programme.  The EC will therefore need to maintain and strengthen 
its interaction with a diverse group of NGOs.  Some NGOs in Liberia have good analytical and policy 
development capacity, and the EC could benefit more from this. 
Policy Coordination with EU Member States 
A  feature  of  the  Liberia  programme  has  been  the  very  close  and  successful  coordination  and 
cooperation between the EC and the Member States.  This has resulted in the Member States placing 
resources from their own assistance programmes under the management of the ACO. The most active 
Member  State  has  been  the  Netherlands,  while  the  UK,  Denmark  and  France  have  also  made 
substantial contributions. The policy dialogue with Me.mber States has  mostly been carried out in 
Abidjan and Brussels. Member States in Abidjan were kept closely informed of developments by the 
Desk Officer for Liberia. This was  particularly important because Members States did not have a 
presence in Liberia. The Desk Officer made a point of getting feedback from the Member States in 
Abidjan when going to Liberia and of debriefing them on the way back, to ensure constant dialogue 
at a regional level.  More recently, the EC Co-ordinator in Monrovia has been attending the monthly 
meetings of Member States in  Abidjan.  In  addition, the Member States have been able to  use the 
ACO when visiting Monrovia. 
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Co-ordination in Brussels primarily takes place at the monthly Mrica Working Group meetings.  In 
these  meetings,  representatives  of the  African  divisions  of the  foreign  ministries  discuss  issues 
relating  to  the  EC'  s  relationship  with  Africa.  The  Desk  Officer was  frequently  called  to  discuss 
Liberian issues and to provide information about the aid strategy and the programme's progress. 
With a good information flow, transparency and mutual respect, there has been a firm basis for policy 
co-ordination between the Desk Officer and Member States. Discussions with MS representatives in 
Abidjan showed that they appreciate the role of the EC in Liberia. They also appreciate the quality of 
the technical programme, which they regard as meeting humanitarian needs, working at a community 
level, and being executed by competent T  A. 
The Member States' support for EC programme has been reflected in their financial and operational 
support. This was  critical  in  allowing the  EC  to  go  forward  with  the election and "jobs for  guns" 
projects  where  the  Netherlands  government  was  able  to  complement  EC  assistance  through  its 
political  and  financial  support,  and  by  providing trucks  for  the  EC  transport  operation.  Both  the 
Netherlands  and the  Danish  governments contributed US$  1.2  million  to  the election process and 
chose to  channel that donation through the EC-ACO. The German government cooperated with the 
EC  in  supporting  the  Monrovia  water  supply  programme,  while  DANIDA  is  cooperating on  the 
development of a rehabilitation programme for the electricity sector. 
E.  The Evolving Agenda 
Donor  co-ordination  in  post-conflict  situations  is  critical.  In  some  countries,  the  lack  of such 
coordination has undermined the recovery process. The absence of coherence and common purpose 
in donors'  interventions can accentuate divisions within the Government and weaken ownership of 
the rehabilitation programme. In Liberia, there is already a divide between the ministries responsible 
for finance and economic planning.  Government officials are also conscious of the extent of donor 
rivalry. 
The EC has  a large  operational and analytical capacity, and has good working relations with  most 
stakeholders. In the World Bank's sponsored reconstruction conference for Liberia, held in Paris on 7 
April 1998, the EC pledged a significant proportion of the total appeal.  The EC clearly has a strong 
interest in ensuring an  effective system for donor coordination and in playing a key role within this 
system.  Increasingly this will need to involve dialogue with the BWI as the focus of external aid to 
Liberia  switches  to  from  rehabilitation  support  to  broader economic  assistance  and  the  need  to 
address the substantial arrears in debt payments to the IMF and other international bodies
7
• 
This debt is equivalent to US$ 1,200 per head of population. 
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CHAPTER IV.  AID MANAGEMENT 
A.  Introduction 
The management of the  aid programme in  Liberia has  been based both on the request by the NAO 
that  the  Chief Authorising Officer of the  EDF act on  behalf of the  Government of Liberia in  the 
management of the  EDF,  and  on  the  close coordination  with  the  assistance  programmes of other 
Member States.  This has facilitated the use of the available relief and development aid instruments in 
a coherent and coordinated way
8
.  A number of factors have been responsible for the overall success 
of EC aid management in Liberia. including: 
•  delegated management within an  accountable framework,  including a strong operational 
capacity in the ACO and a largely supportive institutional environment; 
•  decentralisation of much of the operational authority of the Desk Officer to the ACO; 
•  recruitment of a high quality professional staff; 
•  good co-ordination, and provision of comprehensive and timely information to all parties; 
and 
•  efficient  management  and  administration,  including  a  TA  'iceberg'  contract  structure 
which combined T A fees and operational budgets within one contract. 
Although it is too early to determine whether the programme was a success, preliminary evidence is 
positive. However, the problems of delayed payment and the  timeliness of procurement procedures 
were still present.  Many of these problems  were  alleviated,  though  not  always eliminated,  by  the 
Desk Officer. At the time of the visit, for reasons which are further explained below, implementation 
of a  significant  proportion  of  the  microprojects  had  stopped  because  of cash  flow  problems. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the operation for all its problems appears successful is an indication that 
the EC system can be made to work. 
B.  Programme Management 
The  EC  system  is  highly  centralised,  with  very  limited  spending  and  decision  making  powers 
devolved to  Delegations. That is  one reason underlying delays in project and programme execution, 
as  is  widely  accepted.  As  :!Jere  was  no  Delegation  in  Liberia,  different  ways  of working  were 
required. It was not therefore so much a case of a decentralised system, as an absence of some of the 
centralised structures which in most parts of the EC system cause delays in programme execution. 
Once  the  Desk Officer had  been  appointed,  he  was  accorded  sufficient  authority  to  develop  the 
programme,  and  was  widely  accepted  as  accountable  for  the  outcomes.  In  some  ways 
decentralisation was a function of the fact that the Desk Officer was as much a part of the ACO as of 
Headquarters,  and  had  a  stronger  incentive  than  most  desk  officers  to  push  fmancial  and  other 
decisions through the system. This situation led also to greater ownership on the Liberian side as the 
ACO staff felt  they  had a direct link with  Headquarters, and that everyone was on the  same side. 
Decentralisation was also a function of the inclusion of operational budgets in the TA contracts, so 
quick decision making was possible when required. 
This  aid  management strategy is  spelt out in  the  Financing Conditions  to  the  First and  Second Rehabilitation 
Projects which replaced the standard Financing Agreement. 
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Nevertheless,  although  there  appears  to  have  been  a  good  deal  of operational  independence,  the 
controls and accountability of the activities of the ACO appear to have been tight, in terms of local 
management, and control of all expenditures. 
C.  Recruitment and Staffing 
The technical quality of the staff in the ACO is generally outstanding, with many of the consultants 
possessing considerable Liberian experience and commitment to the country. Staff were selected to 
provide a mix or emergency relief management and technical development skills.  The operation did 
not require EC  officials or NGO  staff who  may  not  have  had key  specialist skills.  The ACO has 
become a large technical operation, housing a well-coordinated multi-disciplinary staff.  This can be 
contrasted  with  the  operation  of a  normal  EC  Delegation  where  staff are  required  to  focus  on 
extensive administrative procedures rather than the technical and operational aspects of programme 
design and implementation.  This technical competence has been an important factor in permitting the 
EC to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with other donors from a position of strength. 
D.  Coordination and Information 
The  Desk Officer has  been  scrupulous  in  disseminating  information  on  the  Liberian  programme 
widely.  This  has done much  to  create good relations with Headquarters. It  has  also reinforced the 
accountability of the staff involved for outcomes. Within the ACO, there were good communications, 
including a newsletter and information sheet prepared by  a specially recruited Information Officer. 
Within Headquarters there were fora for communication and liaison such as the Task Force which 
involved all parties including financial control, ECHO, the food aid unit and the health advisers.  The 
Africa Group also played an important role. 
The  result  has  been  good  coordination  in  the  in  the  use  of different aid  instruments  and  an  aid 
programme that has been able to  meet emergency needs while addressing longer-term requirements. 
An example is the restoration of Monrovia's water supply which was fmanced from both ECHO and 
EDF/255.  The assistance addressed both the urgent need to  avoid disease and keep cholera under 
control as  well  as  the  longer term institution-building requirements.  Emergency rehabilitation and 
measures for strengthening management and improving financial viability were planned and executed 
concurrently. 
E.  Management of T  A Contracts 
Perhaps the most critical ingredient of the success of the Liberian operation has been the consistent 
ability  of the  EC  to  deliver on  its  commitments.  Good  management  implies  a clear purpose and 
resources to back that purpose. Several people interviewed considered that the absence of the normal 
NAO system had been an advantage. 
The management of the ACO itself is also very similar to that of a private sector office. There are 
well- managed procedures to support visiting missions (including Member States representatives) and 
consultants.  Correspondence is processed promptly, and disputed items are referred separately rather 
than used as a reason to hold up processing undisputed items. 
Because of the absence of a Delegate and of a functioning NAO, normal procedures could not be put 
in place, such as double signatory accounts and work programmes. This necessitated fmding different 
ways of working. The most important aspect of the management set-up in the ACO was the inter-
linking of theTA contracts into a mutually supportive network. 
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Two  of  the  TA  firms
9
,  have  'iceberg'  contracts  which  combine  the  provision  of  TA  with 
responsibility for managing operational budgets for the programme, and include systems for covering 
procurement costs.  These operational budgets were covered by bank guarantees, which were fairly 
large in  relation to the size of the firms. The reimbursement of expenditures generally takes at least 
two  months  for  Headquarters  to  process  with  vigorous  paper chasing by  the  Desk Officer.  This 
leaves  the cash flow  of the  firms  exposed,  the  extent of such exposure depending on  the  level of 
activity taking place which  tends  to  be  greatest during the dry season.  This has  necessitated the 
consultants prioritising their activities and at times halting disbursements on some projects pending 
reimbursement from Headquarters.  For example, during the election period priority had to be given 
to  the  implementation of the  election  support assistance  with  the  result  that  implementation  of a 
number of other projects had  to  be  delayed.  Work on  a number of micro-projects also had to be 
suspended on several occasions pending reimbursement of the consultants. 
Despite  the  considerably  simplified  procedures  for  aid  management,  much  staff time  is  spent  on 
seeking the best way to  operate a very cumbersome administrative system.  An example is  the seeds 
and tools programme.  The placement of a contract for farm tools was subject to two months delay 
while the winning tenderers bid was  re-examined and final  specifications agreed.  The purchase of 
seeds has created further problems.  The most suitable supplier is  in  Guinea, and uses  outgrowers 
who need to be paid in advance of delivery.  However, EC procedures do not permit prepayments and 
special arrangements are having to be put in place to  get around this problem which are expected to 
involve the use of Euronaid and of counterpart funds. These problems are not unique to Liberia: other 
countries, such as Angola, have experienced the same protracted procedures, with those tasked with 
purchasing  working  under  enormous  pressure,  resulting  in  significant  delays.  However,  the 
consequences of delays in the arrival of seed can be critical for the families involved. 
On balance the  system has  so  far  delivered,  but there  is  a  general  view  that  the  situation  is  not 
sustainable.  The  operation  also  faces  the  dilemma  of moving  to  the  standard  EC  systems  and 
procedures which are widely perceived by both EC staff and T  As as less efficient and effective.  The 
challenge will therefore be  to  seek ways of maintaining the  impetus and push through mainstream 
procedural reforms that build on the successful experience of programmes like Liberia. 
Agrisystems and Geoscience. 
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Brussels - DGV/l/ 
Mr B O'Neill - Desk Officer 
Monrovia EC Aid Coordination Office 
Mr A Lorkeers 
Mr B Brewer 
Mr C Smith 
Mr A Losseau 
Ms P Fritsch 
Monrovia- Ministry of  Planning and Economic Affairs 
Mr J Howard - Deputy NAO 
Mr C Gabelle - T A 
Monrovia -Ministry of  Public Works 
Mr J Richardson - Minister for Public Works 
Monrovia- Other Donors 
Mr J Baumann - Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy 
Mr R Thomas - USAID 
Mr A Breivik - WFP 
Mr F Downes-Thomas, Special Representative of UN Secretary General 
Mr E Camara- UNHCR 
Mr L Manneh- UNDP 
Monrovia - NGOs 
Ms N Emout - Action Contre le Faim 
Mr E van der Borght - Medecin sans Frontieres 
Mr S Arthy - Merlin 
Mr J Hare - Save the Children Fund (UK) 
Abidjan 
HE Mr A Spekenbrink - Ambassador of the Netherlands 
Mr A Richmond - First Secretary British Embassy 
Mr J Silva- Counsellor French Embassy 
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